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Comment
COMMENT ON PROFESSOR YOO,
ADMINISTRATION OF WAR
RICHARD H. KOHN†
Professor John Yoo performs a valuable service by attempting to
apply the concepts of administrative law to civil-military relations.
“Administrative law scholarship should pay attention to the armed
forces,” he asserts, “not just because it performs the most important
function of the executive branch, but because it is the largest part of
1
the executive branch.” What he does not remind readers, more
importantly, is that control of armed force has been an issue since the
beginning of government—because those who have the power to
coerce also possess at least the potential to control society.
There is also benefit in applying principle-agent theory to
improve civilian control in the executive branch. Professor Yoo notes
persuasively that, in dealing with the military, the president possesses
2
sufficient removal authority —a chief tool of executive control—even
if that power is in part limited by, among other things, the military’s
iconic status and special legitimacy in American society, factors that
Yoo neglects. Indeed, he writes that “[r]emoval . . . may be both too
3
blunt and too narrow a tool to improve civil-military relations,”
although Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has used it beneficially
since 2006, whereas his predecessors foreswore it to their
disadvantage.
Yet in seeking “to expand the field of inquiry” in administrative
4
law to “the broader issue of control of the military,” Professor Yoo
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1. John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277, 2283 (2009).
2. See id. at 2292.
3. Id. at 2303.
4. Id. at 2283.
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commits such fundamental errors of fact and interpretation as to
invalidate his overall analysis and vitiate his suggestions.
Professor Yoo’s most egregious error is to write about civilian
control of the military as though it is exclusively a function of the
executive branch. Most damaging is the claim that “[c]ivilian control
of the military . . . is expressed nowhere in the [U.S. Constitution]
5
except in the Commander-in-Chief Clause.” Professor Yoo must
mean “expressed” in the most literal and narrow (and thus
misleading) terms because civilian control of the military pervades
the Constitution to the point of obsession. Article I gives Congress
6
the power to create or disband military forces, make rules for their
7
governance, define the circumstances and procedures for mobilizing
the state militias (and “provide for organizing, arming, and
8
9
disciplining” them), approve appointments of officers, raise (and
10
11
deny) money, and more. The federal judiciary possesses wide
jurisdiction over the armed forces—even if judges and justices chose
not to exercise that jurisdiction for many decades after the
Constitution went into effect, and then to forfeit much of that
jurisdiction during the Chief Justiceship of William Rehnquist. All
officers of government must swear or affirm to support the
Constitution, including its preamble to “insure domestic Tranquility”
12
and “provide for the common defense.” The Framers understood
that physical control of the armed forces was impossible. They wished
no single branch to be able to control the armed forces lest that
branch use the military to dominate the other branches and
overthrow the Constitution itself. Divided, shared, differentiated,
overlapping, and sometimes conflicting authority over the armed
forces is the heart of civilian control in the U.S. Constitution, and
civilian control in the United States has played out that way
13
historically. In his writing on war powers elsewhere, Professor Yoo
14
seems to acknowledge this.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 2281.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–13.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–16.
Id. pmbl.
See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND
POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 177–80, 400–27 (1957); LOUIS SMITH, AMERICAN
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In citing Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers as the
most authoritative understanding of presidential war powers (and, by
extension, civil-military relations, which nest within various war
15
powers), Professor Yoo misleads both himself and his readers.
Hamilton’s views of executive power were extreme even in the 1780s
and were largely opposed by contemporaries. As Richard Beeman
notes in a thoughtful new history of the making of the Constitution,
Hamilton’s long speech (“five to six” hours) at the constitutional
convention, proposing extraordinary power and authority for the
16
presidency, “was greeted with a deafening silence.” “Hamilton’s
views strayed so far from mainstream republican principles that they
appeared not to merit a response. In fact, no one even rose to dispute
them” and “none of [the Framers] was prepared to create the sort of
17
‘elected monarch’ envisioned by Hamilton.” At Hamilton’s death,
his friend and colleague Gouverneur Morris, himself a federalist who
supported executive primacy and worked closely with Hamilton in
Congress in the 1780s and later, admitted privately before giving
Hamilton’s eulogy in 1804 that Hamilton “was in principle opposed to

DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY POWER: A STUDY OF CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY POWER
IN THE UNITED STATES (1951); HOWARD WHITE, EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE IN DETERMINING
MILITARY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 15–63 (Ayer Co. Publishers 1979) (1925); Richard
H. Kohn, Civil-Military Relations: Civilian Control of the Military, in THE OXFORD COMPANION
TO AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 122, 122–25 (John Whiteclay Chambers II ed., 1999);
Richard H. Kohn, The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Framers, in THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1989, at
61, 61 (Richard H. Kohn ed., 1991); Jonathan Lurie, The Role of the Federal Judiciary in the
Governance of the American Military: The United States Supreme Court and “Civil Rights
Supervision” over the Armed Forces, in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1989, supra, at 405, 405–30; Diane H. Mazur,
Rehnquist’s Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the March of Martial Law, 77 IND. L.J. 701,
705–32 (2002); Steven L. Rearden, Congress and National Defense, 1945–1950, in THE UNITED
STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989, supra, at
271, 271–89. For an in-depth discussion of the history of military justice, see generally
JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING MILITARY JUSTICE: THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF MILITARY APPEALS, 1775–1950 (1992); 2 JONATHAN LURIE, PURSUING MILITARY JUSTICE:
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, 1951–
1980 (1997).
14. JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 30–142 (2005); JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S
ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR x–xii (2006); see also Yoo, supra note 1, at 2293 (Professor
Yoo’s lumping of Congress as part of “the principal”).
15. See Yoo, supra note 1, at 2280.
16. RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 169 (2009).
17. Id.
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republican and attached to monarchical government, and then his
opinions were generally known and have been long and loudly
18
proclaimed.” As for The Federalist Papers, Professor Beeman echoes
a common understanding among historians of the period when he
writes that “they were, first and foremost, political propaganda aimed
19
at persuading undecided voters to support the Constitution.”
Professor Yoo begins by noting “the success of the military in
gaining significant policy independence from the political leadership,”
but then he claims that “this is no different than the account of a
federal agency managing to prevail in pursuing its own preferences at
20
the expense of the president or Congress.” The military, however, is
very different from other governmental agencies, not just in its size or
function, but in its very institutional essence. Unlike other
organizations, the military functions under a separate legal system;
training is physical, harsh, demanding, and identity-stripping; its
members accept the risk of death as a condition of performing their
duty; they have obligations around the clock; they operate under far
more unyielding and more rigid discipline than police or other
security forces; the government can compel service and thus at times
some members (and sometimes an overwhelming majority) serve
unwillingly; the hierarchy is pyramidal, rigid, and authoritarian—
more so than any other institution in society save perhaps criminal
gangs; and, most importantly, its members and both the government
and the American people understand and accept its unique status and
fundamental differentiation from the rest of society. The system of
control is sui generis, even beyond the Constitution’s special
provisions for control and subordination; analogies to civilian
agencies and their protocols of administrative control or
subordination just do not fit. Thus, the statement that, “[i]f elected

18. Entry for July 13, 1804, in 2 THE DIARY AND LETTERS OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS,
MINISTER OF THE UNITED STATES TO FRANCE; MEMBER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 456, 456 (Anne Cary Morris ed., Charles Scribner’s Sons 1888). For excellent
short sketches of Hamilton, free of the advocacy of biography, see STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 92–114 (1993); JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN
POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS 32–33 (1993).
19. BEEMAN, supra note 16, at 407. Professor Beeman points out that the Supreme Court
cited The Federalist Papers only once between 1790 and 1800, only fifty-eight times in the
nineteenth century, and thirty-eight times in the first half of the twentieth century, but “in the
last half of that century they were cited no fewer than 194 times,” suggesting that these “hurried,
even frenzied political arguments” were used for judicial argument rather than as authoritative
analysis of the intent and understanding of the Constitution when it was written. Id.
20. Yoo, supra note 1, at 2284.
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leaders have trouble with the military, where their constitutional
powers should be at their height, then their problems will be doubled
21
rests on flawed assumptions.
with the civilian agencies”
Furthermore, there is often a difference between constitutional power
and political reality. Since the early 1980s, the military has possessed
enormous prestige across American society, whereas other federal
agencies have much more limited reputations and constituencies—
and thus clout—both in Congress and amongst the public.
Professor Yoo errs again when he claims that “after General
MacArthur’s firing, civilian-military relations continued without
many problems.” What he writes of as “strains” were often real
22
conflicts or subtle evasion, and on occasion open warfare.
He cites only Michael C. Desch’s work to support the statement
that “leading scholars [note the plural] have observed that civilian
control over the military did not suffer significant disruptions under
23
the pressures of the Cold War.” What Professor Yoo means by
“significant disruptions” is unhelpfully imprecise. My own work, and
that of Peter Feaver, Andrew Bacevich, Eliot Cohen, and others—
including Dale R. Herspring, whom Professor Yoo cites in the very
next footnote—demonstrate that civilian control was often highly
24
contested during the Cold War. Conflict occurred regularly
throughout the period, and civilian officials, including President
Dwight D. Eisenhower, struggled not always successfully (despite

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 2295.
Id. at 2305.
Id.
See ANDREW J. BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY 167–97 (2002); ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW
AMERICAN MILITARISM: HOW AMERICANS ARE SEDUCED BY WAR 34–68 (2005); ELIOT A.
COHEN, SUPREME COMMAND: SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND LEADERSHIP IN WARTIME 173–
207 (2002); PETER FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS 180–282 (2003); DALE R. HERSPRING, THE PENTAGON AND THE PRESIDENCY:
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS FROM FDR TO GEORGE W. BUSH 409–30 (2005); Andrew J.
Bacevich, Elusive Bargain: The Pattern of U.S. Civil-Military Relations Since World War II, in
THE LONG WAR: A NEW HISTORY OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR
II 207, 207–64 (Andrew J. Bacevich ed., 2007); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The
Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 367–86 (1994);
Richard H. Kohn, Building Trust: Civil-Military Behaviors for Effective National Security, in
AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: REALITIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE NEW ERA
(Suzanne Nielsen & Don Snider eds., forthcoming 2009); Richard H. Kohn, The Erosion of
Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Summer 2002,
at 8, 22–37; Richard H. Kohn, Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, NAT’L INT.,
Spring 1994, at 3, 3–17.
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Professor Desch’s examples) to assert their policy preferences. In
June 2007, at a conference at West Point celebrating the fiftieth
anniversary of Samuel Huntington’s seminal book, The Soldier and
the State, I asked a scholar of civil-military relations and the
secretaries of defense whether any secretary of defense had
26
embarked on the office fully trusting the military. The answer was
27
no. All that Desch’s work demonstrates is that, until the 1990s, the
28
civilians largely won these conflicts; it does not explore regular
conflict over budgets, policy, and decisions in which the political and
bureaucratic strength of the military limited civilian choices and
behaviors.
Thus “poor relations” did not begin “with the election of Bill
Clinton,” as Professor Yoo states, but long before, although under
Clinton the relationship did deteroriate dramatically, as did civilian
29
control.
Finally, Professor Yoo argues that uniformed judge advocates
violated civilian control by opposing George W. Bush’s
administration on the detention of terrorist suspects and military
30
31
commissions, an argument he also made in 2007. What voids this
line of thinking is the role of Congress in civilian control and the
ethical obligation of both military and legal professionals to tell the
truth when testifying before Congress and when representing their
clients in court, even if that means a uniformed officer must challenge
the legal rulings of the executive branch. Uniformed lawyers act in a
dual capacity: as military officers and lawyers. They cannot ignore or
circumvent the ethics of either profession when acting in an official
capacity, whether testifying on Capitol Hill or representing a client in
a courtroom. This would violate civilian control of the military only if
one understood civilian control as exclusively within the purview of
25. See, e.g., Andrew J. Bacevich, Generals Versus the President: Eisenhower and the Army,
1953-55, in SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: CASE STUDIES IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
MANAGEMENT 83, 83–99 (Volker C. Franke ed., 2002).
26. Stevenson also authored a historical study of civil-military conflict. CHARLES A.
STEVENSON, SECDEF: THE NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE JOB OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE passim
(2006) (discussing the tenures of several secretaries of defense from Robert McNamara to
Donald Rumsfeld, and the difficulties faced by every occupant of that office).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. DESCH, CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY 22–38 (1999).
29. Yoo, supra note 1, at 2285.
30. Id. at 2290.
31. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A Rational
Choice Approach to the War on Terrorism, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1831–45 (2007).
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the executive branch. Because Congress and the federal judiciary also
exercise authority over the military, officers (and not just military
lawyers) complying with civilian control are merely navigating the
complexities and ambiguities of civilian control as it exists in the
32
United States historically and today.
Contrary to Professor Yoo’s assumption (“all of this has led
historians and political scientists to warn of a crisis in civil-military
relations”), no scholars other than Professor Yoo himself have cited
uniformed lawyers’ opposition, in congressional testimony or court
arguments, to Bush administration legal rulings and arguments, as
33
evasion by the military of civilian control.
In the end, because of these errors of assumption, fact, and
interpretation, Professor Yoo has failed to make administrative law
add to our understanding of civil-military relations in general and
civilian control of the military in particular. His contribution is to
raise the possibility, and perhaps future scholarship will contribute.
But until then, we are left to rely on history, political science,
sociology, anthropology, other subdisciplines of law, psychology,
business, and journalism, all of which in recent years have deepened
our understanding of how civilian control should operate, and how
difficult it is in practice, both in the past and in the United States
today.

32. This point is made clearly in as classic a text as Huntington’s, HUNTINGTON, supra note
13, at 7–18, 163–92, and in as recent a memoir as that of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Richard B. Myers, RICHARD B. MYERS, EYES ON THE HORIZON: SERVING ON THE FRONT
LINES OF NATIONAL SECURITY 7, 270–71 (2009); see also SARAH SEWALL & JOHN P. WHITE,
PARAMETERS OF PARTNERSHIP: U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 22–
23, 42–45 (2009).
33. Yoo, supra note 1, at 2291.

